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BOOK REVIEWS
Volume II: THE BELSEN
The United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1947.
El. ML.Stationery Office, London, Pp. 156, 3S.

LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,

TRIAL, LONDON:

This volume deals with the trials of persons in charge of the Belsen
and Auschwitz Concentration Camps. Of the forty-five persons charged
with war crimes, one was not tried because of illness, and fourteen were
found not guilty. Of the remainder, eleven were sentenced to death by
hanging, and the rest to imprisonment for terms of from one year to life.
In an opening note, Lord Wright, Chairman of the United Nations
War Crimes Commission, comments on the fairness with which the trial,
some of which he witnessed, was conducted, and notes that the British
court was limited by the Royal Warrant to trial of war crimes. It could
not deal with crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, as did
the Nuremberg tribunal.
The account of the trial includes a history of the proceedings, a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and for the defense, the arguments on law, the summary by the Judge Advocate, the verdict and sentences, and some editorial notes.
The most interesting feature of the report is the legal argument for
the defense, by Colonel H. A. Smith, Professor of International Law at
the University of London (p. 69ff), and the answer by the Chief Prosecutor, Colonel Backhouse (p. 104ff). The former argued that the offenses
were not strictly "war crimes" because the acts were not committed in
pursuit of military operations; that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction
over some of the accused because their victims had ceased to be Allied
persons after Germany annexed the territory in which they lived; and
that the accused in any case were protected by German law and superior
orders. The prosecutor successfully answered these arguments by noting
that Allied nationals, whether prisoners of war or not, were protected
by the laws of war; that title to territory could not pass while war continued; that international law, not national law, controlled in war crimes
trials; and that the defense of superior orders was not absolute. In this
argument there was considerable citation of precedents and military
regulations.
Other matters dealt with in the arguments and editorial notes concern
the jurisdiction of military courts, the admissibility of certain types of
evidence, the question of group criminality, and the responsibility of
states and individuals under international law. The defense was given
an opportunity to argue the validity of the charges on fundamental
principles on the theory that the provision of the Royal Warrant barring
objections to the court or its jurisdiction did not bar attacks upon the
charges.
The report is well presented, and makes valuable material available
on the law and procedure of war crimes trials.
University of Chicago

QUINCY WRIGHT
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By Harold Zink. The
MacMillan Company, New York, 1947. Pp. 272. $4.00.
FINAL JUDGMENT: THE STORY OF NUREMBERG. By Victor H. Bernstein.
Boni & Gaer, New York, 1947. PP.xii, 289. $3.50.
American Military Government in Germany is an outstanding contribution to the literature on one of the most important problems of our
day. Professor Harold Zink is eminently qualified to write on the subject of the American attempt to bring democracy to Germany. As Hall
Professor of Political Science at Depauw University he is not only the
author of one of the leading textbooks on American government, but also
has produced numerous scholarly studies in comparative government and
politics. Abandoning the seclusion of his university in 1943, he entered
the U. S. Army. He was assigned to the German Country Unit of
SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces); he
participated in the editing of the Handbook for Military Government in
Germany, he served in the United States Group of the Control Council
for Germany, and he was also a consultant on the re-organization of the
German Government.
Military Government in Germany has been widely branded as a
colossal failure. It has been unfavorably compared with the remarkable
progress of General MacArthur in Japan. Professor Zink has been unsparing in his criticism of the defects of the military in Germany; but
he has been equally emphatic in recording its achievements. He has
brought to his study of Military Government an admirable poise and
balance which permit him to point out in unmistakable terms the weaknesses of the American experiment in Germany while also depicting the
enormous difficulties in the way of Military Government and the real
accomplishments of General Clay and his officers.
As Professor Zink indicates, the War Department at an early stage
in World War II was not unaware of the need of highly specialized
experts. As early as 1942, the Department began to train selected civilians for Military Government. The author rightly proves that the
training laid too much stress on military drill, while incompetent personnel greatly encumbered the training program. On the whole, however, the curriculum of the Military Government School at Charlottesville
and at Fort Custer, as well as in the Civil Affairs Training Schools
(CATS) in twelve universities throughout the United States was admirably conducted. After the assignment of the trained personnel to the
German Country Unit, of. SHAEF at Shrivenham in England, which
served as the Civil Affairs training center prior to D-Day, there was
deplorable waste of time due to lack of proper direction. Many highranking officers were assigned to this task without adequate training or
temperament.
The preparation for Military Government had been unusually complicated. In Washington, SWNCC (State War Navy Coordinating Committee) formulated a top policy which often was expressed by none other
than the President, himself. In the European Theater, general responsibility for Military Government was entrusted to the Commanding
General of the American Forces. During the period of combined AngloAmerican headquarters, general responsibility for Miliary Government
was delegated to G-5 of SHAEF. The United States Group of the
Control Council for Germany was subordinated to this general arrangement. Eventually, G-5 of SHAEF gave way to G-5 USFET (United
AMERICAN iMILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY.
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States Forces, European Theater), and this organization later became
OMGUS (Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone). In preparation
for a Military Government, the Handbook for Military Government in
Germany had gone through three editions. In addition, a multitude of
forms and special manuals dealing with public safety, finances, local
government and civil service had appeared. Thus, the Military Government officer had a mass of paper direction for his task. The over-all
directive, however, was contained in the secret document known as JCS1067, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. These directions
had been formulated partly under the influence of the Morganthau Plan
for vengeance upon Germany, and in some respects were far from
realistic. Fortunately, by the time of the Potsdam Conference in July,
1945, the Morganthau Plan was largely dissipated and more sensible
counsels prevailed.
Professor Zink describes with clarity the transformation of the G-5
staffs into the offices of Military Government at the various levels after
VE-Day. This development was under the supervision of LieutenantGeneral Lucius D. Clay, who had assumed command of the United States
Group of the Control Council in 1944. Dr. Zink expresses high regard
for General Clay. He committed various petty blunders, but on general
policy he was eminently sound.
As Military Government settled down to its task in Germany, it was
confronted with the directives of the Potsdam Conference. The application of these directives in many cases was found to be extremely
difficult. The directives for de-nazification or the removal of all Nazi
officers from the government services was a perplexing assignment.
Wherever the process of de-nazification was carried too far, the efficiency
of local government was seriously crippled. The problem of re-educating
the Germans seemed almost insuperable. American traditions opposed
any program of forcing propaganda upon an alien race. This laudable
attitude tended to make educational planning in the American Zone
overly cautious, negative in concept and lacking in dynamic character.
The goal of democratization was barred by numerous obstacles. Military
Government officers were hesitant to compel the introduction of democratic processes. Nevertheless, some pressure had to be exercised. The
economic program was unquestionably the most complicated problem,
and here Military Government had to fight against the disastrous provision which divided Germany into four separate zones between the
British, American, Russian and French Governments. In spite of all
these obstacles, Professor Zink believes that the American civil administration proceeded with reasonable promptness and efficiency. The task
was stupendous and mistakes were inevitable. Most of them were due
to the tendency of the President and the State Department in Washington to allow the situation in Germany to drift.
The volume contains several helpful maps of the United States Zone
in Germany and organizational charts of OMGUS, the Allied Control
Authority, political parties in the American Zone, and level of industry
plan for 1949 production in Germany. Almost the only imperfection
of the book is the lack of a glossary of symbols. War Department and
military agencies are so numerous that even officers familiar with military government find it necessary to refresh their memories in regard to
symbols.
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Final Judgment by Victor H. Bernstein is not in the same scholarly
category as the study of Professor Zink. The author covered the Nuremberg Trials for an American newspaper. His chapters depicting the
guilt of the Hitler group gloat over the humiliation and condign punishment inflicted upon the twenty-two defendants brought to justice for
their war crimes before the International Military Tribunal. The story
as told by the author is impressionistic and desultory, and fails to give
an adequate appraisal of the trial and its significance to civilization.
The book contains a considerable amount of data on Nazi crimes, including genocide, concentration camps, looting and Jew baiting.
Nortkwestern University

KIENNETH COLEGROVE

THE LONG HOLmAY. By Francis Ambriere. Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, Chicago, 1948. Pp. 264. $3.00.
Francis Ambriere wrote most of The Long Holiday during the 56
months he was a KG (Kriegsgefangener-prisonerof war) in Germany.
In 1946 the book won the author the Prix Goncourt. More than 200,000 copies of the book were sold in one year in France. The author is
one of the leading young journalists who "went to war willingly" to
discover that "the dormant French Army" was staffed by officers who
"could solve difficult geographical problems in the calm of a shelter"
but were "powerless puppets when the Germans struck on the 10th of
May 1940." To the author the early stage of the war before the fall
of France was but a "war of Eunuches" which revealed the "miserable
state of weakness to which our leaders had reduced us." His own weapon
was an old 1872 model revolver and his battery 200 men with only three
machine guns "which never failed to jamb at the fourth volley." With
these he was ordered to "shoot down any German airplanes flying low
over our position." The defeat of France followed "a battle waged by
impotent warriors."
After capture by the Germans the French KG's were herded to positions behind the lines where they passed through the period of stupor
common to all prisoners of war. In this initial misery of capture and
defeat the French KG's brooded over "the stupidity and weaknesses
which we had witnessed'"--a mentality assumed by most war prisoners.
But there were Frenchmen who died fighting. In captivity some of
the KG's developed a kind of "communion of the living with the dead."
F. Ambriere was one of those rebels who carried his fight against tremendous odds even as a prisoner of war.
For the French KG's there were many obstacles of which the most
serious was a "stealthy stultifing stupor." Beyond this the Nazi captors
used French collaborators to convert the French KG's to the "obliging
attitude of the Vichy government." A large number of the French KG's
willingly or unwillingly accepted the Vichy view and joined the labor
forces or agreed to work with Vichy for the Germans and were soon
repatriated. The author was not among these. Because of this and the
fact that he with three others failed in an eseape to "get back to France
by Christmas" he was assigned to the "tough men's barracks."
In the second year it was not exile and confinement alone but "the
permanence of the exile and the confinement" that wore down the
prisoners. This tended to divide the KG's into those who "trafficed
with the Germans and who in turn were liberated" and those "who
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refused to betray our cause and make a travesty of truth." At certain
points in this isolation "duty became obscure and the clearest notions
so distorted that it was not plain to everyone that Germany was our
enemy." Only those who endure in isolation can understand this situation and "captivity probably contains something which can never be
conveyed." This was especially true for French KG's while their own
country was divided and directed under Vichy to the point where packages sent to the prisoners from France contained leaflets advising collaboration. Even French official delegates wearing the Nazi insignia visited
the prison camps in Germany and "preached resignation and submission
to the Great German Reich." At other times the KG's were informed
officially that the "French Government has decided not to request implementation of the Geneva Convention." This to the author was "irrefutable proof of the betrayal of 1,500,000 men by their own government. "
As captivity entered the third year the KG's were assigned to labor
battalions, agricultural groups, forest commandos while those who refused to work or tried to escape were sent to three penal camps at Graibenz, Rawaruska and Kobercyn near Cracow in Poland. Here in the
late fall and winter of 1943 in isolation the KG's waited for the Allied
landing that never came and only the news from the east of the "Stalingrad epic" gave them some hope. While there was greater isolation in
these camps there were a few meager comforts and "considerable barter
between the captives and the guards."
Just as the Allies were at the Rhine the author was convicted by a
military court in Marburg for "insubordination in the presence of an
armed force in war time" which, according to the Hitler military code,
was punishable by life imprisonment or death. As a result he spent
months in solitary confinement. After the advance by the Russians from
the east and the impending attacks in the west the author and others
were moved to the south. Then came the rapid. denouncement during
which large numbers of prisoners of war died of hunger while the "German army was falling to American mechanical superiority" and General
Patton's men spread rapidly across the rolling hills. On April 20th 1945
Francis Ambriere entered Gare de 'Est in Paris from which he had
left almost five years earlier as a soldier of France. He was at home.
Ambriere's book should be read not as a scientific treatment of war
prisoners but with understanding as the outpourings of the experience
of a patriotic Frenchman who suffered endless hardships at the hands of
the enemy and his own country. For the reviewer, as one of those
Americans who participated in the liberation and later repatriation of
French prisoners in Germany, the book has been most interesting. As a
post-war book it has significance. Very few, if any, of the French soldiers were instructed prior to combat of their rights under Article 27
of the Geneva Convention which prohibited the employment of prisoners
of war in war industries. In addition the book depicts the many flagrant
violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners
of war. It might be that peace allows people to forget this and maybe
some think it is unimportant but to the ten million prisoners of war it is,
or was, important, especially so when some of these still remain prisoners
of war in 1948.
Iowa State College
WALTR A. LuNDEN
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Prepared
by The Committee on Classification of the American Prison Association. New York, 1947. Pp. VIII, 88.
At the Annual Congress of the National Prison Association in Cincinnati in 1890 Warden A. A. Brush of Sing Sing, speaking on Prison Discipline said: "When you consider that. our prisoners are composed of
boys, men just entering manhood, the middle-aged and the old, and that
they come here with every conceivable distortion of character; and the
different nationalities with which we have to deal; some hot-tempered,
quick to take offense, which has led them into trouble and caused their
incarceration; others phlegmatic and not easily moved; another set sly
and calculating; another with character so distorted that they are almost
desperate, and with a very little mismanagement will become incorrigible,
it will be easily seen that but few general rules can be laid down."
Despite the obvious truth of Warden Brush's analysis and the same
pronouncements of wardens before and after him, American .prison
administrators assume, expressly or implicitly, that all inmates are members of a specific class, and acting on that assumption, have persisted in
management policies which, if we believe their words, are diametrically
opposed to their statements of the realities of the prison community.
No one familiar with the problems of prison administration, the difficulties inherent in the nature of the situation, the dissatisfaction of the
public, and of serious students of modern penology, can enter a dissenting voice in negative criticism of the enlightened and socially intelligent suggestions and recommendations formulated by the outstandingly
competent leaders in this brief but well-organized handbook.
There are three or four emphatic points of view set forth. (1) Prisons
are for protection of the public. This does not mean temporary custody
based on an out-of-sight brand of penology. (2) Prisoners are human
beings. They are subject to the same worries, fears, hopes, frustrations,
insecurity, status feelings, resentments, and uncertainties as the rest of
us, only more so. Such treatment as they receive and such plans as are
drawn up for them must be definitely related to their needs now and after
release. (3) Those charged with the responsibility of reorganizing attitudes associated with their offenses must be the types of persons who
can gain and hold the confidence of the inmate so that he sees the value
of the program devised for him and finds in it an objective worth striving
for and achieving. No arrogant use of authority, no sentimental regret
for the poor unfortunates, but a sympathetic and intelligently firm application of the fundamental principle of adult conduct that inheres in
demonstrating one's competence to do a given job by doing it-whether
it be a maintenance job in prison or leading a law-abiding life after
release-by assuming one's moral and legal obligations and successfully
fulfilling them.
The philosophy of classification, the organization and personnel of
reception centers, the function of admission classification, the value of
reclassification and progress reports, state-wide uniformity of reports
and standards-all these are handled in clear, elementary language by
men who are no starry-eyed world movers, no ivory-tower academicians,
no ladies '-club speakers on "the prison problem" but hard-headed realists who know that if social protection is ever to be achieved it must come
after the person is released, not while he paces the exercise yard hard by
HANDBOOK ON CLASSIFICATION IN CORRECTIONAL INsTITUTIONS.
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the wall talking over his technical failures with a colleague whose faulty
technique landed him also in the same exercise yard.
In essence, it is hoped through classification based upon complete social,
vocational, educational, psychological, medical, psychiatric, recreational,
and religious knowledge about each inmate to have at least a fair basis
for planning the inmate's stay so that he may derive a maximum benefit
from the institution, that the prison may gradually be socialized, that
the parole authority may be as wise as humanly possible in its handling
of applications, that the parole supervisor will be in a position to do the
best possible job with the man on parole, and the community will be
assured that every bit of relevant information that could be found was
integrated into the program which will produce a responsible and useful
citizen.
It seems to me that classification, in the last analysis, is merely grafting
a sound procedure upon a decadent, if not defunct, system of handling
non-conformists. The way of the transgressor may be difficult, but the
way of handling the problems of the transgressor in a socially mature,
enlightened and profitable fashion is indeed harder. When prisons cease
to be penitentiaries there will be neither criminals nor prisoners, only
persons in need of social guidance. With the best will in the world and
the greatest solicitude for social security and integrity, there will be
no peace until we get rid of the walled areas of evil and start from the
ground up with a new orientation and a new philosophy which will embody the fundamental truth that each person is a different being and as
such, within latitude, must be so recognized despite the criminal code,
even as you and I.
This does not mean that intelligently conceived pre-parole plans are
futile but rather to suggest-perhaps "indicate" is the better wordthat any institution, no matter how enlightened its management, whether
addressed to the individual or the larger purpose of social protection, can
achieve little so long as rules and regulations are imposed to which every
person must conform, whether they make sense or not to the person, or
whether persons who must conform to them find any reasonably sensible
meaning or purpose in them.
For men on parole there is still the typewritten sheet of rules that
commands every parolee to eschew a glass of beer or changing his job,
getting married, or even associating with his "old associates." "Individualized treatment" sounds dangerously like "trial-guilt-convictioncommitment-rules-mechanical conformity-release-obedience-violation of
parole" to this reviewer.
If the present institutional method of disposing of violators of a moderately anachronistic moral code must or will be retained, then this little
handbook per square inch contains more grown-up, non-juvenile, sound
sense than all the learned, esoteric, and mosaic conclusions of criminal
court judges and district attorneys put together--or even foremen of
juries who listen to and beam at lawyers who are gathering votes to be
judges.
In short, this volume makes sense-rare indeed in these days of editorial-writer social policy.
Credit should be given to Lewis Drucker and Frank Loveland, Chairmen of the Committee 1944-46 and 1946-47 respectively.
University of Pennsylvania

J. P. SHALLO0

